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Scarcely any political question arises in 
the United States that is not resolved, 
sooner or later, into a judicial question. 
Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in 
their daily controversies, the ideas, and 
even the language, peculiar to judicial pro. 
ceeding.s . ... The language of the law thus 
becomes, in some measure, a vulgar 
tongue; the spirit of the law, which is pro. 
duced in the schools and courts of justice, 
gradually penetrates beyond their waUs 
into the bosom of society, where it descends 
to the lowest classes, so that at last the 
whole people contract the habits and the 
tastes of the judicial magistrate. 
-Alexis de Tocqueville 
Democracy in America 
hat happens when the lan-
guage of the law becomes a 
vulgar tongue? What hap-
pens, more particularly, 
when parties to bioethical discourse 
are obliged to borrow in their daily 
controversies the ideas, and even the 
language, peculiar to judicial pro-
ceedings? How suited are the habits, 
taste, and language of the judicial 
magistrate to the political, and more 
particularly, the bioethical, questions 
of our time? 
We ask these questions because, as 
the incomparable Tocqueville fore-
saw, Americans today truly do resolve 
political-and moral--questions into 
judicial questions. As Abraham Lin-
coln hoped, the Constitution "has be-
come the political religion of the na-
tion," and many Americans now 
"take for granted that the Constitu-
tion embodies moral as well as legal 
rules." We revere the Supreme Court 
as the great arbiter of American 
moral life, as performing a "prophet-
ic function," as expressing what "we 
stand for as a people." Trial courts, 
L.A. Law wants to teach us, are fo-
rums for the apotheosis of social and 
moral reasoning. The legalist error 
proliferates that "moral rights [neces-
sarily] represent claims that ought to 
be made in legal rights, that ought to 
be protected and enforced by law. "1 
Carl E. Schneid£r is a professor at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law Sdwo~ Ann Arbar. 
Carl E. Schneider, "Bioethics in the language of 
the Law," Ha.stings Center Repurt24, no. 4 (1994): 
16-22. 
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Bioethics in the 
Language of the Law 
by Carl E. Schneider 
Law provides a rich language for thinking about bioethical 
issues and is a tool for action as well as talk. But the lan-
guage of the law, often inapt, regularly fails to achieve its 
desired effect. 
Inevitably, the spirit of the law has 
penetrated into the bosom of bio-
ethics. For one thing, the two fields 
are not wholly distinct: many bioethi-
cists are lawyers, including several 
prominent staff members of several 
influential commissions.2 For anoth-
er, bioethics is as much a political 
movement as an academic discipline. 
This has given bioethicists an incen-
tive to learn and speak the language 
of the law. Further, bioethical issues 
have been framed for public discus-
sion in legal terms in cases from Qy,in-
lan to Cruzan, in the tribulations and 
trials of Baby Doe and Baby M, in 
the constitutional principles of Roe v. 
Wade, in legislative reforms of law at 
the end of life, in referenda in Wash-
ington and California, in the law's 
travails with Jack Kevorkian. Finally, 
the spirit of the law has penetrated 
into the bosom ofbioethics because it 
has penetrated into the bosom of 
society generally: bioethicists partake 
of the habits and tastes of their time 
and place, and those habits and tastes 
are in no small part those of the judi-
cial magistrate. 
It would be easier to see the con-
sequences of formulating bioethical 
issues in legal terms if we knew bio-
ethics' "native language," how it 
would speak freed of legal influences. 
For the reasons I just gave, that coun-
terfactual is unimaginable. We can, 
however, identify qualities we want 
bioethical discourse to have, and 
16 
then ask if the language of the law 
promotes them. I take bioethics to be 
the study of those ethical problems 
relating to health care and ranging 
from questions about how a particu-
lar doctor and patient should make a 
specific decision to questions about 
how American health care should be 
ethically structured. Such questions 
are extraordinarily perplexing, rais-
ing as they do the most basic and 
intractable issues about human life 
and the most intricate and intimate 
issues about human relationships. I 
assume that to treat so wide a range 
of such baffling problems, a rich vo-
cabulary of ethical considerations, 
styles, and approaches is necessary. 
Different bioethical issues arising in 
different contexts may demand a re-
gime of rules or the flexibility of dis-
cretion, a rights discourse or a lan-
guage of duties, public policy analysis 
or private preference, the salvation of 
religion or the neutrality of liberal-
ism, the profits of principles or the 
insights of casuistry, the uses of utili-
tarianism or the devices of deon-
tology, the rigors of economics or the 
consolations of philosophy. In my 
father's house there are many man-
sions. 
I will argue that the language of the 
law has enriched bioethical dis-
course. Law has done so by generat-
ing vivid and pressing instantiations 
of bioethical issues, by scrutinizing 
them-in part-in moral terms, and 
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by proffering means of resolving 
them. It has contributed vocabulary 
and concepts to bioethical discourse 
and offered ways of putting those 
words and ideas into practice. But the 
law's gifts to bioethical discourse and 
to effectuating that discourse should 
be cautiously received. For the law 
has goals that go beyond the immedi-
ate problems of bioethics, and those 
goals peculiarly shape the moral 
terms the law employs and specially 
alter the direction legal discourse 
takes. Furthermore, the law has limits 
that arise from its special social pur-
pose, and those limits crimp the use-
fulness of law's language as a vehicle 
for bioethical discourse. 
Law is essentially a device for social 
regulation. It is the means by which 
society through its government seeks 
to establish a framework for human 
interactions. This framework helps 
set minimum standards for human 
behavior (criminal law and tort law 
exemplify this function), helps estab-
lish and support the institutions and 
practices people use in organizing 
their relations with each other (this is 
what contract and commercial law, 
for instance, do), and helps people 
resolve their disputes (which is a pri-
mary function of civil courts). In this 
century, the law has broadened that 
framework by providing some min-
imum assurances of human well-
being (what we call the welfare state). 
Law's calling as a device for social 
regulation is its boon and bane as a 
language ofbioethics. As boon, law's 
attractions are two. First, it provides a 
highly developed, conceptually fer-
tile, analogically abundant, pro-
fessionally precise, systematically dis-
ciplined language for thinking about 
bioethical issues, a rich language 
Holmes called "the witness and exter-
nal deposit of our moral life. ,s Sec-
ond, law provides a tool not just for 
talk, but for action. As bane, law's 
disadvantages are also two. First, its 
language is often inapt. Second, it 
regularly fails to achieve its desired 
effect, and sometimes seems to have 
hardly any effect at all. 
The Language of the Law 
We turn now to law's first attraction 
as a language for bioethical dis-
course. Because law has centuries of 
Hastings Center Report, July-August 1994 
experience with social regulation, it 
offers a highly articulated method 
and language for analyzing social 
problems. That method, in America, 
is the common law process: courts 
build legal principles incrementally, 
by evaluating one case at a time; 
legislatures intermittently respond 
with reforms and reconsiderations. 
One might think of it as Rawls's re-
flective equilibrium in action. It is a 
method well suited to a field as new 
and febrile as bioethics, since it 
brings to bear long-nurtured prin-
ciples on emerging problems. And it 
is a method particularly congenial to 
medicine and applied ethics, since, 
like them, it relies in important ways 
on cases. 
This almost dialectical, common 
law method has over the last millen-
nium elaborated a language of social 
regulation. That language includes a 
vocabulary not just of terms, but of 
conceptual, organizing ideas. Three 
sets of ideas form idioms that particu-
larly influence bioethical debate and 
that will repay attention: law's dis-
pute-resolution function, its facilita-
tive function, and its rights discourse. 
One of law's oldest aims is to help 
people resolve disputes. American 
law does so partly through the law of 
torts. When one person injures 
another, the law may authorize a tort 
suit. This is the legal remedy when 
one person strikes another with his 
fist, runs over another with his car, 
sells another a defective product, or 
commits professional malpractice. 
The tort action provides a way of set-
tling the dispute between the ir:tiurer 
and the victim and of restoring the 
victim to his prior well-being. By set-
ting the substantive terms for resolv-
ing disputes, tort law also establishes a 
standard of behavior which-one 
hopes-may shape conduct so that 
injuries are deterred, disputes are 
forestalled, and, even, people behave 
better. 
Because the language of torts pro-
vides a convenient pattern for think-
ing about those bioethical issues that 
arise where one person has injured 
another, it has seemed a promising 
response where doctors abuse their 
power over patients. Building on tort 
doctrines (like the principle that 
people may not be touched unless 
they have given their consent), courts 
17 
have developed a principle of in-
formed consent This principle serves 
three bioethical goals: to help resolve 
disputes over injuries caused by a 
doctor's fuilure to inform a patient 
adequately; to recompense-how-
ever crudely-the injured patient; 
and-more ambitiously-to improve 
the way doctors treat patients. 
The law tries to conduce to good 
not just through tort law, but also 
through what I call the facilitative 
function-by, that is, lending people 
the law's authority to use in organiz-
ing their relations with each other. A 
familiar example of this function is 
the law of contracts, which allows 
people to reach whatever agreements 
about their affairs they desire, and to 
deploy the law's power to make those 
agreements binding and thus pre-
dictable and reliable. The facilitative 
function also lets people recruit the 
law's force to give binding effect to 
their personal preferences. Two com-
mon examples of this are the will and 
the power of attorney, which permit 
people to dispose of their property as 
they wish or to allocate that power to 
someone else. 
As bioethics began to hunt for ways 
of enhancing the power of patients, 
the idiom of the facilitative function 
attractively presented itself. Some 
people have, for example, sought to 
reform the relationship between doc-
tors and patients by treating it in con-
tractual terms. (This effort has foun-
dered because of a classic problem 
with contract law: contracts tend to 
ratify preexisting differences in 
power.) More successful have been 
analogies to the law of wills and the 
law of agency (the law authorizing 
powers of attorney). Out of those 
analogies have arisen the living will 
and the durable power of attorney, 
devices that extend the authority of 
patients to control their medical 
treatment when they can no longer 
think and act for themselves. 
Finally, as Cardozo said, "The great 
ideals of liberty and equality are pre-
served against the assaults of oppor-
tunism, the expediency of the passing 
hour, the erosion of small encroach-
ments, the scorn and derision of 
those who have no patience with 
general principles, by enshrining 
them in constitutions." This process 
evokes the language of rights, a Ian-
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guage that has achieved a potence 
and preeminence in the United 
States unmatched anywhere in the 
world. That language is woefully 
muddled by our tendency to conflate 
moral rights, statutory rights, and 
constitutional rights. But constitu-
tional rights are undoubtedly the 
trump cards of our legal system. 
Hastings Center Report, July-August 1994 
drawbacks arise from law's role as a 
means of social regulation. More 
specifically, the law's language is 
shaped for a system with a particular 
aim-social regulation. That aim it-
self is a limited one-to shape and 
not to supplant social practices and 
institutions. And the law is a blunt 
chisel even for that task. 
The law's rights discourse has seemed delightfully suited 
to that engine of bioethical thought, the doctrine of 
autonomy. 
Once recognized, they massively pre-
vail against statutes that infringe on 
them. What is more, they have not 
just a legal, but also a luminous social 
and moral authority. 
The law's rights discourse has 
seemed delightfully suited to that en-
gine of bioethical thought, the doc-
trine of autonomy. Thus proponents 
of one set ofbioethical positions have 
enlisted the doctrine of constitu-
tional rights with overwhelming ef-
fect in the law of reproduction gener-
ally and abortion specifically. Because 
the debate over that law was phrased 
in rights terms, its language, tone, 
content, and result have been trans-
formed. And proponents of another 
position have similarly labored, with 
some profit, to transpose the dis-
course about euthanasia into a de-
bate over a-constitutional-right to 
die. 
In America, then, the language of 
the law lies easy on the tongue. It 
abounds in productive principles and 
illuminating analogies. It provides fa-
miliar and powerful tools for analyz-
ing many social problems, including 
many bioethical issues. And to a no-
table extent, bioethical discourse has 
been phrased in legal terms, has been 
conducted in courts and legislatures, 
and has won legal reforms. But allur-
ing as the law's language is, it has 
drawbacks and limits that are notal-
ways perceived or understood. like 
the attractions of that language, these 
First, the idioms of the law are 
often less apt than they might appear. 
They have arisen in response to 
needs for social regulation, but the 
systemic imperatives that shape the 
law are sometimes a poor pattern for 
bioethical discourse. For example, 
the law of torts is centrally a way of 
compensating victims of an injury. 
But bioethicists have wanted the law 
of informed consent not just to rem-
edy specific failures to inform pa-
tients, but to fundamentally reform 
the relationship between doctors and 
patients. However, tort law ill suits this 
ambitious goal. For one thing, the 
language of torts is the language of 
wrongs. That language states only 
minimum duties; it is not the lan-
guage of aspiration. A doctor may 
obey it through quite mechanical and 
sadly unsatisfactory routines that 
mock the dialogue bioethicists imag-
ine for doctors and patients. Further-
more, the law penalizes the breach of 
even those minimal duties only 
sporadically-when a patient has ac-
tually been injured by that breach, 
when the injury is great enough to 
justifY the expenses of a suit, and 
when the patient realizes all this and 
is willing to sue. 
More broadly, not just tort law, but 
the law generally, is inept at shaping 
relationships-particularly relation-
ships that are instinct with intimacy. 
The field that tries most direcdy to do 
so-family law-is perhaps the sorri-
18 
est of law's enterprises. As James Fitz-
james Stephen wrote, "To try to regu-
late the internal affairs of a family, the 
relations of love or friendship, or 
many other things of the same sort, 
by law or by the coercion of public 
opinion, is like trying to pull an eye-
lash out of a man's eye with a pair of 
tongs. They may put out the eye, but 
they will never get hold of the eye-
lash. "5 Familial affairs involve rela-
tions among people who deal with 
each other in private on a personal 
basis concerning intimately personal 
questions and consulting personal 
values that are passionately felt In 
such affairs, it is hard for law to learn 
what is going on in the relationship, 
to write rules that will fit each rela-
tionship, to supervise it, and to in-
duce people to follow those rules and 
cooperate with that supervision. 
The relationship between doctor 
and patient is not always all that it 
might be, and it is sometimes more 
bureaucratic than personal. But it 
can partake, and its members often 
want it to partake, of those qualities 
that make it inapt for the law's re-
gime. Thus trying to organize that 
relationship through tort law may be 
an example of what Judith Shklar dis-
paragingly calls "the structuring of all 
possible human relations into the 
form of claims and counterclaims 
under established rules. "6 
A second drawback of analyzing 
bioethical problems in legal terms is 
that law is a system of social regulation, 
a system whose parts should mesh 
into what Holmes called "a thor-
oughly connected system, "7 that is, a 
(reasonably) coherent body of prece-
dent and principle. Jurists have wor-
ried for centuries that changing one 
area will unexpectedly alter another. 
Such concerns help explain, for in-
stance, the Supreme Court's decision 
in Cruzan,8 in which the Court was 
asked to declare a constitutional right 
to die. The Court might have done so 
except for Roe v. Wade,9 which estab-
lished a right to an abortion. The 
court has been reconsidering Roe, 
and several justices regret ever em-
bogging themselves in the jurispru-
dential and political quagmire of 
abortion and its questions of constitu-
tional interpretation and federalism. 
Whatever the moral appeal of the 
Cruzans' right-to-die argument, ac-
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cepting it would have reinforced Roe 
and its expansionist view of constitu-
tional analysis and judicial power. 
Thus even a justice who liked much 
in the Cruzans' argument might have 
rejected it for fear of its systemic im-
plications. 
This point can be put somewhat 
differently. Every judicial opinion 
looks forward as well as backward; 
every opinion is both based on prece-
dent and itself becomes precedent. 
Yet a court cannot easily anticipate 
what kind of precedent an opinion 
will become, for the cases and argu-
ments it will govern are cloaked in the 
mists of the future. The resulting fear 
of the unforeseen consequences of 
each legal precedent is one reason 
slippery-slope arguments are so com-
mon and so telling in law. Anticipat-
ing consequences is particularly ur-
gent where, as in Cruzan and Roe, 
"privacy" rights are at stake. To main-
tain the vigor of those rights, the 
Court has made it structurally ardu-
ous to justify a statute that conflicts 
with them. Yet this has introduced a 
crucial and almost perverse rigidity in 
the law: the Court hesitates to define 
interests as "rights" because that deci-
sion's consequences are so severe. 
The stronger the doctrine of rights, 
then, the more reluctant the Court 
must be to deploy it. Thus the m<9or-
ity in Cruzan declined to find a "right 
to die" in the Constitution partly for 
fear of what Cardozo called the "ten-
dency of a principle to extend itself to 
the limits of its logic. "10 
Seen in this light, Cruzan is not 
hard to understand. The Court faced 
several kinds of systemic pressure to 
cabin the privacy rights it had an-
nounced in Roe, and it dreaded the 
slippery slope it might slide down. In 
addition, it faced a substantive ques-
tion-euthanasia--whose slopes were 
notoriously slippery, whose contours 
had changed with chastening speed, 
and whose future dimensions were 
disturbingly murky. Thus, however 
the justices may have assessed the 
ethical merits of the Cruzans' posi-
tion, whatever their views of good 
public policy, and however seductive 
the idiom of rights, they fuced strong 
systemic reasons not to create a right 
to die. 
This leads us to a third limitation of 
thinking about bioethical problems 
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in legal terms. Law is a system of social 
regulation, and social regulation is 
the art of the possible and the neces-
sary. Out of a sense of what is norma-
tively desirable and practically pos-
sible, American law seeks only to plan 
a bare framework for society and not 
a complete blueprint for it Our law 
does not-unlike civil law-even 
aspire itself to be a complete system. 
Thus there are often gaps in legal 
doctrine where legal institutions have 
not fully dealt with an issue. 
One such limitation arises from the 
fact that our judicial system is pri-
marily driven by litigants. Cases they 
do not bring cannot be a<ljudicated. 
Arguments they do not make will not 
be heard. Another limitation arises 
from the fact that law relies on prece-
dent. Propositions for which there is 
no precedent will have trouble 
making their way into law. One ex-
ample of this "incompleteness" prob-
lem appears in the law of rights. That 
law has historically flourished in one 
paradigmatic situation-where a 
single individual confronts the state. 
VIrtually all rights thinking in Ameri-
can law is organized around that par-
adigm. "In such conflicts," as I once 
wrote, "we are predisposed to favor 
the person, out of respect for his 
moral autonomy and human dignity. 
That predisposition also rests on our 
assumption that the state can bear 
any risks of an incorrect decision bet-
ter than the individual can."n But in 
bioethics the conflict often is not be-
tween one person and the state, but 
between two people, each with a 
claim against the other and each with 
a rights claim against the state. Our 
legal rights doctrine tells us little 
about how to make such choices be-
cause those are not situations the law 
was designed to cope with. 
Pregnancy contracts exemplify this 
problem. In the Baby M case, did Mr. 
Stern have a constitutional right to 
father a child in this way? Did Mrs. 
Whitehead have a constitutional 
right to raise Melissa, the child she 
had borne? Did Melissa have a consti-
tutional right to a decision made in 
her best interests? To be reared by 
her natural mother? To stay in touch 
with both her natural parents? Little 
in our crude and crabbed doctrine of 
constitutional rights helps answer 
those questions. 
19 
In this section, I have observed that 
law's language can enrich bioethics' 
discussion of the moral and public 
policy issues that subject treats. Yet I 
suggested that courts and legislatures 
speak a language shaped by the 
special exigencies of a legal system of 
social regulation, a language that is 
easily misunderstood by an unwary 
public and that fits uneasily with the 
language of bioethical reflection. In 
particular, I discussed that part of the 
law's language closest to the main-
springs of bioethical discourse-the 
law's rights talk. I suggested that 
rights talk is narrow enough to begin 
with. Ladd, for instance, profitably 
contrasts that talk with a broader dis-
course, the language of "responsi-
bility." In bioethics, "a responsible de-
cision may require consideration of 
such different things as risks and 
benefits, other relationships, con-
cerns, needs and abilities of persons 
affected by and affecting the deci-
sion. In addition, to make responsible 
decisions it is usually necessary to 
'weight' a number of factors against 
each other; the final decision often 
requires what we generally call judg-
ment.'" He contrasts rights talk: "De-
cisions based on rights, on the other 
hand, are quite different. They do 
not permit taking into account most 
of the considerations mentioned, 
and they do not involve the same 
kind of weighing, deliberation, judg-
ment, etc., that is called for in cases of 
responsibility. "12 
But rights talk in the law is impor-
tantly more limited even than in 
ethics, for the apparent similarity of 
the law's rights talk and bioethics' au-
tonomy principle is misleading. Bio-
ethics can describe a principle of au-
tonomy complex and modulated 
enough to assimilate the full range of 
relevant moral considerations. But 
the law is constrained by its function 
as an agency of social regulation. It 
must find authority in legal prece-
dent, fit its rights principles into a 
demanding context, and articulate 
rights doctrines that can be translated 
into the day-to-day work of courts, 
lawyers, and citizens. Such factors are 
inevitable in any system of law. How-
ever, they corrode the wide-ranging, 
subtle, and complex principles neces-
sary to a system of ethics. And they 
suggest one reason that some bioethi-
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cal versions of the autonomy prin-
ciple will not readily be transformed 
into law. 
Political and Judicial Questions 
This leads us to law's second advan-
tage as a language of bioethical dis-
course. Perhaps law's most beguiling 
aspect is that it is not just talk. It is also 
a way of actively, directly trying to 
change the world. It is not the only 
way, nor always the best way, but it has 
conspicuous attractions. 
The first such attraction is that law 
embodies an already established en-
forcement structure. Further, that 
structure is backed, ultimately, by 
society's fiercest instruments of coer-
cion. For instance, the fear of crimi-
nal prosecution even today influ-
ences-and some say, should in-
fluence-decisions about terminating 
medical treatment And opponents of 
abortion precisely want to use the crim-
inal law to prevent abortions. 
But law is not just a structure of 
regulation backed by force. Law also 
enjoys social and moral authority. 
Laws are often obeyed because 
people believe they should obey the 
law. And people are subtly but truly 
influenced by the law's expressive 
capacity (which exploits the law's 
power to impart ideas through words 
and symbols) and by the social force 
(the force of familiarity, custom, and 
legitimacy) acquired by institutions 
the law supports. This is, for instance, 
one defense of the law of informed 
consent: even though recalcitrant 
doctors may evade it, it symbolizes 
society's aspirations for medicine. 
That symbol, over time, supported by 
an emerging practice, and taken with 
other legal and social measures, may 
gradually prevail in the minds and 
methods of doctors. 
The law is an appealing device for 
change for yet another reason-
there are so many points of access to 
it. The law can be reached through 
the instruments of democracy and 
through litigation, all means available 
(in principle) to anyone. This helps 
explain why people trying to chal-
lenge, for instance, the institutional 
authority of medicine and the indi-
vidual power of doctors have sought 
to speak in the voice of the law. 
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Despite these attractions, almost all 
laymen and too many lawyers grossly 
overestimate the law's precision and 
reach. Why does law so often fail to 
translate hopes into reality? Once 
again, it is crucial that law is a system 
of social regulation. Bioethical reflec-
tion can analyze each case meticu-
lously to seek the right result for that 
case. But a system of social regulation 
cannot trust each decisionmaker to 
make each case right. Nor can it 
tolerate discretion's inconsistency 
and unpredictability. Further, a wisely 
considered and carefully formulated 
rule may produce the right result in 
more cases than the ad hoc efforts of 
individual decisionmakers. For all 
these reasons, justice may require 
that an agency of social regulation 
substitute rules for discretion. Fur-
ther, considerations of efficiency may 
lead to the same result. As Alfred 
North Whitehead wonderfully wrote, 
It is a profoundly erroneous tru-
ism, repeated by copy-books and 
by eminent people when they are 
making speeches, that we should 
cultivate the habit of thinking 
about what we are doing. The pre-
cise opposite is the case. Civiliza-
tion advances by extending the 
number of important operations 
which we can perform without 
thinking about them. Operations 
of thought are like cavalry char-
ges in a battle-they are strictly 
limited in number, they require 
fresh horses, and must only be 
made at decisive moments.13 
But of course, when you adopt a 
rule, you risk diminishing the chance 
of doing exact justice in every case, 
since rules by their nature sweep 
many somewhat diverse cases into a 
single category. This is the problem 
the Missouri legislature faced in the 
statute tested in Cruzan. That statute's 
rule set a high standard of evidence 
for terminating treatment The legis-
lature presumably calculated that 
making such decisions discretionary 
was likelier to produce more "errors" 
than the rule it adopted. Similarly, 
some states have concluded that a 
rule prohibiting pregnancy contracts 
will yield more good results than a 
series of discretionary decisions 
about enforcing each specific con-
tract. But both rules pay a cost in 
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wrong decisions, as the facts of 
Cruzan suggest 
Rules have another drawback. 
They must be so clear and compre-
hensible that the people who apply 
them will understand them. Yet clar-
ity exacts a cost in justice. This pro~ 
lem plagues bioethics. For example, 
doctors reasonably complain that tort 
law's hazy "reasonable patient" stan-
dard tells them frustratingly little 
about their duties. Yet critics who 
want a doctrine of informed consent 
with real bite reasonably complain 
that a clearer standard would leave 
uncovered the numerous unforeseen 
situations that ought to be covered. 
In all these ways, then, the lan-
guage of the law must give up some-
thing-and sometimes a great deal-
in precision and in sensitivity because 
of the contexts in which law is actually 
applied. But there is a further, deeper 
problem. One of the great truths 
about law is that with unnerving 
frequency, it fails to achieve the ef-
fects intended for it, and sometimes 
quite fails to have any effect at all. 
Some of the most fascinating modern 
legal scholarship reminds lawyers 
how removed their talk is from the 
world's ken. That literature reveals 
that, to the lawyer's chagrin, busi-
nesses resist using contracts, ranchers 
do not know what rules of liability 
govern damage done by wandering 
cattle, suburbanites do not summon 
the law to resolve neighborhood dis-
putes, engaged couples do not know 
the law governing how they will own 
property when they marry, citizens 
repeatedly reject the due process pro-
tections offered them, and, what is 
worse, all these people simply don't 
care what the law says.14 
Much the same can be said of many 
of the law's recent bioethical reforms. 
There is evidence that as few as 10 
percent of us have made an advance 
directive, that only a quarter of us 
have signed an organ donor card 
(despite the swarms of us who say we 
want to be donors), that even com-
petent patients are not widely con-
sulted about do-not-resuscitate or-
ders, that doctors have reduced in-
formed consent to one more bureau-
cratic chore, and that plaintiffs rarely 
win informed consent suits. 
What is going on here? Well, of 
course, lots of things. But central 
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among them is society's enormous 
complexity and the narrow relevance 
of the law to it People are enticed by 
many pressures beyond those the law 
creates. They have their own agendas 
and, more important, their own nor-
mative systems. The law writes rules, 
but the governed-when they know 
the rules--often have the incentives, 
time, and energy to avoid them. 
Consider advance directives. They 
offer an apparently irresistible way of 
speaking in one of life's greatest 
crises. Yet people spurn them. They 
do so because they have their own 
lives to lead. Momentous as the crisis 
may be, it will generally not seem ur-
gent until it arrives. People resist con-
templating their own mortality. They 
heartily dislike and don't easily un-
derstand legal forms; they find them 
obscure and darkly imagine how they 
might be misused. For that matter, 
people may doubt that they will be 
used at all. Further, many people 
have trouble envisioning their cir-
cumstances years into the future or 
how they would respond to those hy-
pothetical circumstances. And I sus-
pect that people expect that decisions 
about their welfare would in any case 
fall to people they trust-to their 
families. In short, advance directives 
were formulated and promoted by 
people-bioethicists, lawyers, and 
doctors, for instance-who know 
what they want to do through them 
and keenly want to do it But many of 
us are not clear about what we want 
and about whether getting it is worth 
the costs. 
In short, while the language of the 
law may have penetrated into the 
bosom of society, it must still, in 
quotidian life, compete with the 
many other languages that people 
speak more comfortably, more 
fluently, and with much more convic-
tion. These are languages of religion 
and morality, of love and friendship, 
of pragmatism and social accommo-
dation, of custom and compromise. 
The danger for bioethicists, then, is 
believing too deeply that law can 
pierce the Babel, can speak with pre-
cision, can be heard. 
The Spirit of the Law 
I have tried to show how law's func-
tion as an agency of social regulation 
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produces a language that, despite its 
uses and attractions, can be an inapt 
idiom for bioethical discourse and 
even for transforming bioethical 
principles into social policy. I now 
want to propose that "sociopsycho-
logically," if not logically, that lan-
guage may tend to sway us in unde-
sirable directions. I will suggest two of 
them. 
Let me give a brief example of my 
first concern. Every year I ask my (law 
and medical) students whether they 
have any moral obligation to give 
blood. They immediately bristle and 
tell me that the law should not re-
quire people to make such donations. 
I repeat what I have already told 
them, that I am not asking about legal 
duties, but about moral ones. They 
reply that no such obligation should 
be imposed on them, whether by law 
or any other outside force. When I 
ask why those of them who have given 
blood have done so, they say that they 
happen, purely as an arbitrary matter 
of personal preference, to want to do 
so. Like the subjects of Habits of the 
Heart, even their "deepest ethical vir-
tues are justified as matters of per-
sonal preference. "15 
I think this story has many explana-
tions. The one relevant to our prob-
lem begins with the observation that 
law generally conceives of problems 
in terms of rights, whether constitu-
tional or not. This promotes bin-
ethics' own legalistic tendencies, for 
"it is hardly an exaggeration to say 
that discussions of medical ethics 
often amount to little more than 
glosses on the rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. "16 It is 
often desirable for people to look on 
their relations with government in 
rights terms. It is sometimes neces-
sary for people to look on their rela-
tions with other people in those 
terms. But making rights central to 
one's world view carries a danger: 
Thinking in terms of rights en-
courages us to ask what we may do 
to free ourselves, not to bind our-
selves. It encourages us to think 
about what constrains us from 
doing what we want, not what ob-
ligates us to do what we ought. 
Legal rights are tellingly different 
from moral rights in this respect: 
When philosophers talk about 
21 
rights, they commonly talk about 
a complex web of relationships 
and duties between individuals; 
when lawyers talk about rights, 
they commonly talk about areas 
of liberty to act without interfer-
ence.17 
This tendency of rights thinking is 
exacerbated in the United States by 
the feeling that to assert one's rights 
is a virtue, that "to demand our 
rights, to assert ourselves as the moral 
agents we are, is to be able to demand 
that we be dealt with as members of 
th . f h b . "18 e community o uman emgs. 
In dealing with the government, this 
may often be true. However, 
attitudes appropriate to civil 
rights may be inappropriate to 
privacy rights. Civil rights are 
rights to participate in self-govern-
ment and society. Such partici-
pation is at least a virtue and may 
be a duty. But privacy rights are 
in a sense the opposite of civil 
rights--they are rights not to be 
affected by government and so-
ciety-and to forego their use can 
be a virtue and even a duty.19 
One reason rights thinking is so 
prevalent in the United States is that 
in a self-consciously pluralist and 
secular society other sources of value 
have lost much of their authority. But 
this also aggravates the risks of rights 
thinking, for it deprives people of the 
incentives for modulating rights 
claims that a moral system can supply. 
My students vehemently believe that 
nothing should bind them to give 
blood; only their "arbitrarily" chosen 
preferences counsel them to do so. 
Nothing in rights thinking requires 
this kind of response, but in a world 
in which the language of the law has 
become a vulgar tongue, that response 
comes all too readily to the lips. 
Another "sociopsychological" peril 
lies in abandoning people to their 
rights. If doctors and patients meet 
clad in the armor of their rights, both 
of them will lose as well as gain: "The 
physician who is now instructed to 
obey the 'informed consent' of his 
patient, no matter how harmful he 
feels that action to be for the patient, 
is not only permitted but positively 
enjoined to separate himself from his 
patient, to respect his patient's 'au-
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tonomy' by suppressing his own iden-
tifications, his self-confusions, with 
that patient. ,2() Robert Zussman sug-
gests that such a separation may be 
taking place: "While a number of ob-
servers of the medical scene have ar-
gued that patients and patient advo-
cates may demand rights in response 
to the impersonality of relations with 
physicians, few have noted that physi-
cians may also become advocates of 
patients' rights in response to the im-
personali~ of their relations with 
patients . ..2 As Charles Bosk writes, 
"The dark side of patient autonomy 
[is] patient abandonment. "22 
Of course, rights thinking has 
achieved its present power in bio-
ethics exacdy because of medicine's 
long history of paternalism and be-
cause of its long prospect of increas-
ingly bureaucratic and impersonal re-
lations between doctor and patient. 
The question I raise is about the costs 
of responding to these evils in too 
legalistic a way: "The worse the society, 
the more law there will be. In Hell 
there will be nothing but law, and 
due process will be meticulously ob-
served."23 
The Vulgar Tongue 
In this paper, I have argued that law 
offers a rewarding language of social 
regulation. But I have also contended 
that, as a vehicle for discussing 
morally consequential issues like 
those in bioethical disputes, that lan-
guage is momentously limited and 
often inapt. Law is the language of 
social regulation, and hence obeys 
systemic imperatives that are ir-
relevant to and may even conflict with 
genuine understanding and wise res-
olution of moral issues. This is why 
Holmes saw himself "as a judge whose 
first business is to see that the game is 
played according to the rules wheth-
er I like them or not. "24 It is why Car-
dozo thought the judge "is not to 
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to 
vague and unregulated benevolence. 
He is to exercise a discretion in-
formed by tradition, methodized by 
analogy, disciplined by system, and 
subordinated to 'the primordial ne-
cessity of order in the sociallife.'"25 
Of course courts and (much more) 
legislatures sometimes speak in moral 
Hastings Center Report, July-August 1994 
terms. But that fact must be under-
stood in light oflaw's task as a system 
of social regulation: "The law is full of 
phraseology drawn from morals, and 
by the mere force of language con-
tinually invites us to pass from one 
domain to the other without perceiv-
ing it .... Manifesdy, therefore, noth-
ing but confusion of thought can re-
sult from assuming that the rights of 
man in a moral sense are equally 
rights in the sense of the Constitution 
and the law. "26 Cruzan does not ex-
press the Court's belief about wheth-
er Nancy Beth Cruzan should have 
been allowed to die. Rne does not 
state the Court's view of the desirabil-
ity of Texas's abortion statute. The 
law of informed consent does not 
embody any legislature's whole sense 
of the ethical duties of doctors to 
patients. All this sharply and crucially 
limits both the extent to which the 
language of the law may safely be 
imported into bioethical discourse 
and to which bioethical ideas may 
be effectively translated into law. 
We no doubt must live with the :fuct 
that the law has become in some 
measure a vulgar tongue, that its spir-
it has penetrated into the bosom of 
society. Yet we should remember that 
the law's calling is to regulate social 
life, however awkwardly, and its lan-
guage reflects that purpose. That is its 
strength. But like any lexicon, law's 
vocabularies must be handled cau-
tiously. For its idioms rule us in ways 
we do not always grasp or desire, and 
they have limits growing out of the 
ends for which they were created. 
References 
1. John Ladd, "Legalism and Medical 
Ethics," in Contempurary Issues in Biorrwdical 
Ethics, ed.John W. Davis, Barry Hoffmas-
ter, and Sarah Shorten (Totowa, NJ.: 
HumanaPress, 1977), pp.13, 14-15. 
2. "As most public men are or have 
been legal practitioners, they introduced 
the customs and technicalities of their 
profession into the management of public 
affairs." Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America, vol. 1 (New York: Vmtage, 1959), 
p. 290. 
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path 
of the Law," in CoUected Legal Papers (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920), p. 170. 
4. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of 
the judicial Process (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1921), pp. 92-93. 
22 
5. James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity: And Three Brief Essays 
(1873; reprint, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), p. 162. 
6. Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Murals, 
and Political Trials (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 10. 
7. Holmes, "Path of the Law," p. 168. 
8. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health, 497 US 261 (1990). 
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). 
10. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial~ 
cess, p. 51. 
11. Carl E. Schneider, "Bioethics and 
the Family: The Cautionary View from 
Family Law," Utah Law Review 1992, no. 3 
(1992): 819-47, at838. 
12. Ladd, "Legalism and Medical Eth-
ics," pp. 27-28. 
13. Alfred North Whitehead, An Intro-
duction to Mathematics, rev. ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 61. 
14. Two fine examples of this literature 
are Stewart Macaulay, "Non-contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study," American Sociological Review 28 
(1963): 55-67, at 55; and Robert C. Ellick-
son, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settl£ 
Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1991). 
15. Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the 
Heart: Individuals and Commitment in Amer-
ican Life (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1985), p. 6. 
16. Ladd, "Legalism and Medical Eth-
ics,"p. 6. 
17. Carl E. Schneider, "Rights Dis-
course and Neonatal Euthanasia," Califur-
niaLawReview76 (1988): 151-76, at 163. 
18. A. I. Melden, Rights and Persons 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1977), p. 25. 
19. Schneider, "Rights Discourse and 
Neonatal Euthanasia," p. 164. 
20. Robert A. Burt, "The Limits of 
Law in Regulating Health Care Deci-
sions," Hastings Center Repurt 7, no. 6 
(1977): 29-32, at 32. 
21. Robert Zussman, Intensive Care: 
Medical Ethics and the Medical Profession 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), p. 87. 
22. Charles L. Bosk, AlJ God's Mistakes: 
Genetic Counseling in a Pediatric Hospital 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), p. 158. 
23. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American 
Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977), pp. 110-11. 
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Ideals 
and Doubts," in CoUected Legal Papers, p. 
307. 
25. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial ~ 
cess, p. 141. 
26. Holmes, 'ThePathoftheLaw,"pp. 
171-72. 
